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CRISTIE FORD and MARY CONDON SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS SPECIAL ISSUE
The point of departure for this exciting collection of articles is to advance the scholarly treatment of "new governance" by shifting its focus away from what regulators do or how they do it, and towards examining the encounter between new governance and business organizations, within those organizations themselves.
1 As is evident from this issue, this shift still provides a broad canvas on which to work, as the types of business activity examined here through the lens of new governance encompass railways, food safety, corporate privacy, and bank lending, as well as securities and derivatives trading. A particular strength of the articles in this issue is the presentation of original empirical research, ranging from surveys of business in the UK food sector (Hutter) and a case study of corporate restructuring (Sarra) to interviews with privacy officers (Bamberger and Mulligan), bankers (Conley and Williams), and corporate monitors (Ford and Hess) . While most of the papers focus on specific domestic contexts for business activity, Conley and Williams' paper is pitched at the global take up of the Equator Principles for project lending, and Ford and Hess comment on comparisons between Canada and the United States in the implementation of corporate monitorship programmes.
The editors of this issue are committed to the idea that the analysis of new governance needs to move beyond theory into practice and implementation.
Accordingly, we do not engage in an exhaustive description of the contours of the phenomenon in this introduction. We also do not engage with the distinctions between discrete versions of new governance or between new governance and related regulatory approaches. Much of this mapping has been ably undertaken elsewhere (see, e.g., Gilad 2010; Wisconsin Law Review 2010; de Búrca and Scott 2006, 2007) . What is relevant for our purposes is the broad agreement in the literature around several elements central to new governance. The first is a restructured and more collaborative relationship between the state and regulated entities, based on the recognition that regulation may operate most effectively when it incorporates private actors' context-specific experience and relevant expertise (Freeman 1997; Grabosky 1995) , as well as potentially the experience and expertise of other nonstate actors (Parker 2002) . This may extend to public recognition and enforceability of "rules" developed by nonstate actors (Meidinger 2006; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) . Second, new governance imagines giving regulated entities greater autonomy to design their own internal processes to meet broadly defined outcomes (Lobel 2004; Coglianese and Lazer 2003) . This freedom is counterbalanced by mechanisms designed to force transparency and accountability. Specifically, the articles in this issue connect to new governance from the particular vantage point of business organizations' compliance functions, internal governance mechanisms, and/or self-regulation. New governance has special relevance to such functions because it envisions a dynamic and endogenously developed understanding of governance and compliance (Ford 2008) . The focus on developing regulatory strategies that place responsibility on organizations for their own compliance, and that try to foster or engage with authentic compliance-supporting internal motivations, is of central importance to the current project.
Third, the theoretical new governance approach emphasizes problemsolving and experimentation in the ongoing design of regulatory strategies (Sabel and Simon 2004; Sparrow 2000) . Moreover, because of our preoccupation with implementation, this issue has a particular affinity with the most explicitly pragmatic, learning-by-doing versions of new governance, notably experimentalism (Dorf and Sabel 1998). Finally, some new governance and related scholarship incorporates broader emancipatory, democratic, or neo-republican concerns (Shearing and Wood 2003; Dorf and Sabel 1998; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) . While that more ambitious agenda is not fully engaged here, broad stakeholder participation and "voice" is a fourth theoretical underpinning, essential to both legitimacy and effectiveness, and it is touched on in some form by all of the authors in this issue.
The authors each take as his or her point of departure a specific set of Sarra's article suggests that shareholders are increasingly signalling that derivatives transactions are a more effective market-based strategy for risk management than the capacity to exercise "voice" in corporate decision making. More generally, however, an increasing focus on risk management as a strategy of governance in business organizations raises difficult issues about who will ultimately be able to participate in governance processes, since risk management has been conceived in the academic literature as a process that privileges technocratic and "expert" knowledge (Power 2007; Beck 1992 In implementing new governance processes, the significance to be accorded to specific bodies of "expertise" is highly contextual and situation dependent. Hess remain cautious about whether a complete solution to this problem would lie in the development of a profession of "corporate monitor" with more organizational compliance expertise, because of the potential for insularity, homogeneity, and lack of public accountability that may result.
IV. MOTIVATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
A number of the articles speak to whether it is possible to identify factors that motivate organizations to embed new governance processes internally.
There is some convergence evident in the Conley and Williams, Bamberger and Mulligan, and Hutter articles, as they all reference external pressures, whether from consumers, the public, or the idea of "reputational risk."
Conley and Willams and Sarra also reference economic self-interest as a driver of participation in new governance initiatives. This point bears further examination, however, because one of the key insights of Sarra's article is indeed that shareholders' self-interest with respect to debates about optimal corporate governance has changed with the decoupling (via derivatives) of an economic interest from the legal rights traditionally embedded in the shareholding relationship. In other words, the economic interests of shareholders are not static but are themselves reconstituted in the process of negotiating corporate governance norms (Hutter, this issue;
Condon 1998). Ford and Hess find a general lack of enthusiasm among the businesses researched to embrace the fundamental organizational changes proposed by monitorships-thereby reinforcing their conviction that meaningful enforcement matters-though, since these initiatives follow on the heels of regulatory enforcement processes, their organizational subjects are unlikely to be "compliance leaders" anyway (Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 2005) . This lack of enthusiasm may also in part speak to the question of "capacity" noted by Hutter as a key predictor of the likely success of new governance initiatives.
V. NEW GOVERNANCE AND ENFORCEMENT Some scholars of new governance are quick to point out that the horizontal and experimental approach they advocate will not be successful in the absence of a rigorous enforcement regime (Ford 2005; Karkkainen 2004 A final question for an introduction that seeks to synthesize the findings of a diverse set of articles is whether there are generalizable insights to be derived therein. In our view, the "thick descriptions" (Geertz 1973, 6 ) of specific organizational contexts that these articles provide are precisely the point. 
